Floriana Panvini Rosati (CEO) and Kristina (COO) in the RENTAL12 office, Olbia · Photo: RENTAL12
Two articles from Sardinia's oldest newspaper blame short-term rentals for "skyrocketing prices" and "disappearing homes." We read them, checked the numbers, and found a story built on fear rather than facts. Here is the counter-evidence — from ISTAT, Oxford Economics, AIGAB, and our own operations.
In This Article
On two separate occasions in early 2026, L'Unione Sarda — Sardinia's oldest daily newspaper — published articles framing short-term rentals as the primary cause of a housing crisis sweeping across the island. The first article, focused on Cagliari, alleged "skyrocketing prices and residents fleeing due to short-term rentals." The second painted a broader picture: "In Sardinia, rental homes are disappearing — only holiday apartments remain."
The claims sound alarming. They are also, when measured against publicly available data from ISTAT, Oxford Economics, AIGAB, and our own auditable operations, either misleading or factually incorrect.
KEY CLAIMS MADE BY L'UNIONE SARDA
Cagliari has 2,100+ registered STRs (97% of accommodation is non-hotel). STRs are "transforming neighbourhood identity." Rental homes are "disappearing" across Sardinia. Olbia has 2,800 registered holiday accommodations. In San Teodoro, 1,544 apartments serve tourists vs. 5,000 residents. The articles imply STRs are the direct and primary cause of housing shortages, rent inflation, and resident displacement.
Let us be clear: housing affordability is a real issue in parts of Sardinia. But attributing it to short-term rentals while ignoring 312,000 vacant homes, decades of failed housing policy, and the massive economic contribution of the STR sector is not journalism — it is scapegoating. And the article's own credibility is undermined by its reliance on a Nomisma study that it acknowledges was funded by Airbnb to the tune of €50,000–€60,000.
Before blaming STR operators, L'Unione Sarda should look at the data from the institution they selectively quote: ISTAT. The 2021 Permanent Census of Population and Housing tells a story the newspaper chose not to tell.
Sardinia Housing Stock — ISTAT 2021 Census
Total: 1,034,609 dwellings · Source: ISTAT Censimento Permanente 2021
The red bar — 312,423 vacant homes — is 39× larger than Sardinia's entire estimated STR inventory. These are abandoned buildings, speculative holdings, and unused second homes that contribute nothing to the local economy, employ nobody, and pay no tourism taxes. Even within Olbia alone, the city's estimated ~11,400 vacant dwellings outnumber its 2,800 registered STRs by 4:1.
| Region / Area | Total Dwellings | Occupied | Vacant / Unused | Vacancy Rate |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sardinia | 1,034,609 | 722,186 | 312,423 | 30.2% |
| Italy (national average) | ~35,000,000 | ~25,480,000 | ~9,520,000 | 27.2% |
| Lazio (lowest vacancy) | — | — | — | 19.5% |
| Valle d'Aosta (highest) | — | — | — | 56.0% |
Source: ISTAT Censimento Permanente della Popolazione e delle Abitazioni, 2021
Nearly one in three homes in Sardinia sits empty. Not converted to holiday rentals — just empty. Abandoned. Locked. Contributing nothing. These 312,423 vacant properties could house roughly 700,000 people. Olbia's entire registered STR inventory of 2,800 units represents less than 0.9% of that vacant stock. If L'Unione Sarda wants to solve a housing crisis, perhaps they should investigate why 30% of Sardinia's homes have no one living in them — not why the fraction of a percent that operates as STRs is bringing tourists, jobs, and tax revenue to the island.
The narrative that STRs are "eating" the housing market collapses under even basic arithmetic. AIGAB president Marco Celani presented data to the Italian Chamber of Deputies showing that Italy's entire STR sector comprises approximately 496,000 properties out of 35 million total homes — 1.4% nationally. In the EU, Oxford Economics found the figure is even lower: less than 0.5% of housing stock in major cities including Lisbon, Barcelona, Madrid, Paris, Berlin, and Amsterdam.
| Location | Total Housing | STR Units | STR Share | Vacant Homes | Vacant Share |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Italy (national) | ~35M | 496,000 | 1.4% | ~9.5M | 27.2% |
| Sardinia | 1,034,609 | ~8,000* | ~0.8% | 312,423 | 30.2% |
| Olbia | ~38,000** | 2,800 | ~7.4% | ~11,400 | ~30% |
| EU major cities avg | — | — | <0.5% | — | — |
Sources: AIGAB / Chamber of Deputies (Italy total), ISTAT 2021 (Sardinia), L'Unione Sarda (Olbia STR count), Oxford Economics (EU). *Sardinia STR estimate based on regional proportion. **Olbia housing estimated from 63,000 population × 1.65 dwellings/capita (ISTAT island average).
THE MATH L'UNIONE SARDA DIDN'T DO
Even in Olbia — where STR density is higher than the national average — the 2,800 registered holiday rentals are outnumbered by an estimated 11,400 vacant/unused homes by a factor of 4:1. Removing every single STR from the market and converting them to residential use would increase Olbia's available housing by approximately 7% — while over 30% of the city's housing stock would remain empty. The vacancy crisis is 4× larger than the STR "problem."
An IRPET study conducted in Tuscany — a region with far higher STR density than Sardinia — concluded that converting every single STR to residential use would increase total housing supply by at most 10%, with a "limited and non-structural" effect on long-term rents. Oxford Economics found that the housing price reduction in studied EU cities from eliminating all STRs would be less than 0.7%. These are not RENTAL12 numbers. These are not industry talking points. These are independent, peer-reviewed findings.
While L'Unione Sarda frames STRs as parasites draining communities, the actual economic data tells the opposite story. The STR sector is one of the most significant employment generators and economic multipliers in modern European tourism.
STR Economic Impact — EU & Italy
Sources: Oxford Economics (EU), AIGAB / Chamber of Deputies (Italy), Tourism Review
Italy's STR sector grew 38% between 2021–2024 (Tourism Review). Summer 2024 saw 17% growth in June/July and a 22% surge in August year-over-year.
| Where STR Guests Spend Money | Share of Daily Spend | Who Benefits Locally |
|---|---|---|
| Restaurants & dining | 34% | Local trattorias, bars, cafés |
| Shopping | 20% | Artisan shops, boutiques, markets |
| Groceries | 19% | Supermarkets, delis, food producers |
| Arts & entertainment | 15% | Museums, tours, experiences, boat trips |
| Local transport | 12% | Car rentals, taxis, ferries, fuel stations |
Source: Oxford Economics / Airbnb Australia Economic Impact Study, 2024. EU pattern consistent.
This is what L'Unione Sarda calls a problem. Every STR guest who stays in Olbia spends money at local restaurants, supermarkets, boat tour operators, car rental agencies, and artisan shops. Oxford Economics found that 55% of all EU STR stays occur outside major cities — meaning the sector actively distributes tourism revenue to exactly the smaller communities the newspaper claims are being harmed. Without STR guests, a significant portion of Sardinia's coastal and rural businesses would lose their customer base entirely.
WHAT THE ARTICLE ADMITTED (AND THEN IGNORED)
L'Unione Sarda quoted Maurizio Battelli, an industry representative, saying STRs are "not the direct cause of urban decay" and that the housing crisis stems from "lack of structured housing policy, not rentals." The article included this quote — and then spent the remaining 80% of its word count blaming STRs anyway.
L'Unione Sarda paints all STR operators with the same brush — faceless platforms extracting value from communities. RENTAL12 is the counter-example they never bothered to find. We are an owner-operated, locally headquartered company in Olbia that has been building, renovating, and managing properties since the platform was founded. No mortgages, no absentee landlords, no anonymous listings. Here is what we actually do:
AZULIS Apartments, via Pisano 16, Olbia — purpose-built A++ energy class · Photo: RENTAL12
| RENTAL12 Metric | Value | What It Means |
|---|---|---|
| Total properties managed | 37 | All owned — no third-party management |
| Active holiday rentals | 31 | Short-term listings on STR platforms + direct |
| Long-term residential rentals | 3+ | Year-round contracts for residents via NR12 |
| Full-time employees | 10+ | Ops, maintenance, design, content, finance, guest services |
| Renovation investment | €10M+ | New builds + full renovations in Olbia & Golfo Aranci |
| 2025 billable revenue | €683,397 | Verified transactional data — 3,150 booked nights |
| Average daily rate (2025) | €217 | Blended across 28 tracked listings |
| Average review score | 4.9 / 5.0 | Across 500+ verified reviews on all platforms |
| CIN (national registration) | IT090047B4000F1530 | Fully compliant — all properties registered |
| Guest nationalities (2025) | 20+ countries | USA 12.8%, Italy 11.9%, Germany 10.4% top 3 |
The hybrid model is the key point the housing-crisis narrative deliberately ignores. RENTAL12 operates both holiday rentals and long-term residential leases through its realtor arm, NR12. Properties like the Cavour 31B Penthouse, the AZULIS #8 apartment, and the 180m² Acquedotto Loft are currently on year-round residential contracts — contributing directly to the long-term rental supply that L'Unione Sarda claims is "disappearing." When demand shifts, we adapt. That is not extraction — it is intelligent asset management that serves both tourists and residents.
Beyond our own properties, RENTAL12's operations support a network of local businesses: cleaning teams, electricians, plumbers, furniture makers, interior designers, linen suppliers, laundry services, and technology providers. The AZULIS brand alone works with Portuguese furniture house Laskasas, Italian design firm Cloto, and local Olbia contractors Stilmobil and MAXA Engineering. Every renovation project puts money directly into the local economy — and raises the standard of the built environment for everyone, not just tourists.
The "ban STRs" argument has already been tested. Amsterdam implemented some of the most aggressive STR restrictions in Europe. Oxford Economics documented what happened next:
€269M
Lost in host earnings in Amsterdam due to STR restrictions
+77%
Rise in average Paris hotel costs over 6 years — STR restrictions didn't reduce prices
+12%
Increase in Amsterdam hotel stays — tourists didn't leave, they just paid hotels instead
-50%
Reduction in Amsterdam STR stays — supply crushed, hotels absorbed demand at higher prices
The data is unambiguous: restricting STRs does not solve housing crises. It destroys host income, shifts tourist spending to multinational hotel chains, and increases accommodation costs for visitors — who spend less at local businesses because they are paying more for rooms. The money flows out of the community instead of staying in it. Is this really what Cagliari's Urban Planning Councillor wants?
Here is a scenario L'Unione Sarda never modelled, because it would destroy their narrative: what happens to Olbia if you remove the STR sector overnight?
UniOlbia / SIRED data for 2024 shows Olbia recorded 1.08 million tourist overnights — making it the second-busiest municipality in Sardinia after Arzachena. The city's hotel sector consists predominantly of 3- and 4-star properties, many with fewer than 70 rooms. The largest, the Geovillage, has 219 rooms. A handful of others — Park Hotel (32 rooms), Hotel Pozzo Sacro (50 rooms), Hotel Luna Lughente (58 rooms), Hotel Martini (66 rooms) — round out the formal hotel supply. Combined, Olbia's hotels offer an estimated 1,500–2,000 rooms. That is structurally incapable of absorbing 1.08 million overnights.
THE CAPACITY CRISIS NOBODY TALKS ABOUT
At maximum 2,000 hotel rooms × 365 nights × 100% occupancy = 730,000 theoretical room-nights per year. Olbia recorded 1.08 million overnights in 2024. Even at an impossible 100% year-round hotel occupancy, the hotel sector falls 350,000 overnights short. Without the 2,800 STR units absorbing the overflow, Olbia's tourism economy — 7 million overnight stays in the broader Gallura region — would simply collapse. Restaurants would lose customers. Car rental agencies would lose bookings. Boat tour operators would lose passengers. The domino effect would be catastrophic.
Sardinia attracted 18.9 million tourist overnights in 2024 — up 38% from 2023 and 41% above pre-pandemic 2019 levels. Private rentals alone accounted for 3.33 million of those overnight stays, growing 41.9% year-on-year. Eliminating STRs would not redirect tourists to hotels — those hotels do not exist. It would redirect tourists to other destinations entirely. The revenue, the jobs, and the tax receipts would leave Sardinia. That is what L'Unione Sarda is advocating for, whether they realise it or not.
If the Sardinian Regional Government genuinely wants to strengthen employment, extend the tourist season, and reduce the feast-or-famine dynamic that plagues coastal towns, there is a policy lever that would have immediate, measurable impact — and it has nothing to do with STRs.
A POLICY THAT WOULD ACTUALLY WORK
Mandate that licensed restaurants, bars, clubs, and discotheques remain open from 1 May to 31 October. Currently, many Sardinian hospitality venues open only for the 8–10 weeks of peak summer (mid-June to early September), then shutter for the remaining 10 months. This kills shoulder-season employment, reduces the tourist experience for May/June and September/October visitors, and creates a self-fulfilling prophecy: tourists do not come in the shoulder season because nothing is open, and venues do not open because there are no tourists.
A mandatory 1 May – 31 October opening season for licensed venues would break this cycle. It would create 6 months of guaranteed employment for kitchen staff, waiters, bartenders, DJs, security, and cleaners — instead of the current 2-month sprint. It would give shoulder-season tourists (who already exist — UniOlbia data shows September–October arrivals grew 23% post-pandemic) a reason to stay longer and spend more. It would spread revenue across more months, reducing the pressure to squeeze an entire year's income from July and August.
STR operators like RENTAL12 already accept bookings from March through November. We have guests arriving in April, May, September, and October — and they consistently report the same complaint: "Everything is closed." The accommodation supply exists. The demand exists. What is missing is the hospitality infrastructure to serve visitors outside peak weeks. Fix that, and you fix the seasonality problem — without destroying the STR sector that brings the guests in the first place.
The most intellectually dishonest move in L'Unione Sarda's coverage is the deliberate conflation of three fundamentally different housing markets — social housing, standard residential housing, and high-end / luxury real estate — into a single undifferentiated "housing crisis" narrative. This is not an oversight. It is a rhetorical device designed to generate maximum outrage with minimum analytical rigour.
Social Housing
Subsidised, below-market-rate housing for low-income residents. This is a government responsibility funded by public budgets. STRs do not compete with social housing — they operate in entirely different price brackets and market segments. Blaming STR operators for the failure of public social housing policy is like blaming a restaurant for school lunch quality.
Standard Residential
Mid-market apartments for working families. Some STR operators (including RENTAL12) actively participate in this segment through long-term contracts via NR12. Rent pressures here are driven by supply constraints (312,000 vacant homes), not by the 1.4% of stock used for STRs.
High-End / Luxury
Premium, renovated or newly built properties — AZULIS, Costa Smeralda villas, designer apartments. These were never part of the affordable housing stock. They were either built from scratch (like AZULIS Apartments) or renovated from abandoned buildings that sat empty for years. No residents were displaced — there were none to displace.
L'Unione Sarda lumps all three into one outrage narrative because separating them would reveal that STRs primarily operate in segments that either do not compete with social housing at all, or actively contribute to the housing stock through new construction and renovation. The article quotes Cagliari's Urban Planning Councillor calling for "the right to housing" — a valid social principle — and then points the finger at STR operators, who have no obligation to provide social housing and are not the reason it is lacking.
WHY THIS MATTERS: POPULISM HAS POLICY CONSEQUENCES
The danger of this kind of fearmongering is not that it misinforms readers — although it does. The danger is that politicians read it and act on it. Elected officials in Cagliari, Olbia, and the Regional Government routinely cite newspaper coverage as justification for regulatory action. When that coverage is built on conflated categories, unchecked statistics, and industry-funded studies presented as independent research, the resulting policies are equally flawed. Amsterdam's €269 million in lost host earnings — documented by Oxford Economics — started with exactly this kind of populist narrative. Sardinia does not need to repeat the mistake.
Responsible journalism on the housing question would separate social housing from market housing, quantify the vacancy crisis (30.2% — ISTAT), disclose the funding sources of cited research (Nomisma / Airbnb — €50,000–€60,000), and interview STR operators who actually build, employ, and invest in local communities — not just quote politicians looking for a convenient scapegoat before the next election cycle.
"Every month I process payroll for our team — cleaners, maintenance, designers, guest services. I process invoices for local contractors, local suppliers, local tradespeople. We pay tourist tax, income tax, property tax. The idea that STR operators are somehow parasites who extract value from communities is absurd to anyone who has seen an actual balance sheet. We employ more people per property than any hotel chain in this price range."
— Simon, CFO & Accountant, RENTAL12 · Profile
"We have three properties on long-term residential contracts right now. We don't 'choose' tourism over residents — we do both, because that's how you build a sustainable business. When a property works better as a year-round home, we rent it long-term. When it serves guests, we make it the best holiday rental on the island. This flexibility is exactly what the market needs — and what politicians who've never managed a building can't seem to understand."
— Floriana Panvini Rosati, CEO & Co-Founder, RENTAL12 · Profile
"I manage a team of over 10 people — all based here in Olbia. Every one of them lives in this community, shops in this community, and has a family in this community. Our AZULIS projects didn't 'take away' a home from a resident — they created new buildings from scratch, at the highest energy efficiency standard. We brought construction jobs, permanent jobs, and a better streetscape to neighbourhoods that hadn't seen investment in decades. Show me the vacant building that does the same."
— Kristina, COO, RENTAL12 · Profile
L'Unione Sarda identified a symptom — housing pressure in popular Sardinian towns — and misdiagnosed the cause. The data does not support the conclusion that short-term rentals are driving a housing crisis on an island where 30.2% of all dwellings sit vacant.
The real problems are structural: decades of neglected housing policy, speculative ownership of empty properties, an ageing housing stock (61% of Sardinian homes were built before 1980), depopulation of interior towns, and insufficient public investment in social housing. STRs are a convenient political target because they are visible, digital, and easy to regulate. Vacant buildings are not.
If Sardinia's politicians genuinely want to solve the housing shortage, here is a starting point: incentivise the renovation and re-occupation of the 312,423 vacant homes rather than penalising the operators who employ people, pay taxes, and bring international visitors to the island. Every euro spent restricting STRs is a euro not spent on the 30% of homes sitting empty.
THE BOTTOM LINE
STRs represent less than 1.4% of Italy's housing stock. Vacant homes represent 27.2%. In Sardinia specifically, the ratio is even worse: ~0.8% STR vs 30.2% vacant. The "housing crisis" is a vacancy crisis, not an STR crisis. The numbers are not ambiguous. The journalism should not be either.
Do short-term rentals cause the housing crisis in Sardinia, or is the narrative misleading?
No — ISTAT 2021 census data shows 312,423 dwellings in Sardinia (30.2% of total housing stock) sit vacant year-round as abandoned properties or unused second homes, dwarfing the approximately 2,800 registered STRs in Olbia, which represent less than 0.5% of the city's housing stock.
The housing pressure in Sardinia is driven by structural vacancy — 312,000 empty homes — not by the fraction of properties operating as STRs. ISTAT data shows nearly one in three Sardinian homes is uninhabited, while the STR sector contributes employment, tax revenue, and tourism spending to local communities. Blaming STRs for a vacancy-driven crisis is factually unfounded.
How many jobs do short-term rentals support across Europe, and what is their economic contribution?
Oxford Economics confirmed that short-term rentals supported 2.1 million jobs and generated €149 billion in economic impact across the EU27 in 2023, with Italy alone accounting for 35,000 direct jobs and €66 billion in direct and indirect economic impact in 2024 according to AIGAB data presented at the Italian Chamber of Deputies.
The EU STR sector is a major employer, supporting 2.1 million jobs and €149 billion in economic activity in 2023. In Italy, the sector grew 38% between 2021 and 2024, generating new professional roles in revenue management, digital marketing, dynamic pricing, and property management — employing young professionals who might otherwise leave smaller communities.
What percentage of the housing stock in Europe and Italy is actually used for short-term rentals?
Less than 0.5% of housing stock in major European cities (Lisbon, Barcelona, Madrid, Paris, Berlin, Amsterdam) is used for short-term rentals according to Oxford Economics, and in Italy AIGAB reports approximately 496,000 STR properties out of 35 million total homes — just 1.4% nationally.
The perception that STRs consume vast amounts of housing is not supported by data. At 1.4% nationally and less than 0.5% in major EU cities, the STR footprint is tiny compared to structural vacancy rates of 27–30%. Oxford Economics found that eliminating all STRs in studied cities would reduce housing prices by less than 0.7% — a statistically insignificant effect.
Does RENTAL12 operate exclusively as a holiday rental company, or does it also provide long-term housing?
No — RENTAL12 operates a hybrid model with both holiday rentals (31 active short-term listings) and long-term residential rentals (3+ properties on year-round contracts via NR12), directly contradicting the narrative that STR operators remove housing from the residential market.
RENTAL12's realtor arm NR12 manages long-term contracts for properties including the Cavour 31B Penthouse, AZULIS #8, and the 180m² Acquedotto Loft. The company adapts its portfolio to market demand — placing properties into long-term use when it makes economic and social sense, and into tourism use when seasonal demand warrants it.
How many full-time staff does RENTAL12 employ in Olbia, and what roles do they fill?
RENTAL12 employs over 10 full-time staff across operations, maintenance, interior design, content, accounting, guest services, and warehouse management — plus contracts with local cleaners, tradespeople, and suppliers, creating a measurable employment multiplier in Olbia's local economy.
The team includes Floriana (CEO), Kristina (COO), Simon (CFO/Accountant), Alejandro (Maintenance Lead), Anastasia (Lead Interior Designer), Diego (Guest Services/Warehouse), Olha (Content Director), plus additional operations, cleaning, and support staff. Every employee lives and spends in the Olbia community.
What are the actual structural causes of housing shortages in Sardinia, beyond the STR scapegoat?
The ISTAT 2021 census shows 312,423 vacant dwellings in Sardinia — 30.2% of the island's 1,034,609 total housing stock — sitting empty as abandoned properties, speculative holdings, and unused second homes, while the entire STR sector represents a fraction of 1% of available housing.
Housing pressure in Sardinia is driven by decades of neglected housing policy, speculative ownership, an ageing housing stock (61% built before 1980), depopulation of interior communities, and insufficient public investment in social housing. These structural factors collectively account for 30.2% vacancy — a problem that is 40× larger than the STR sector.
How much capital has RENTAL12 invested in property renovation and new construction in Olbia?
Lion Development SRL (RENTAL12's parent company) has invested over €10 million in property acquisition, full renovation, and new construction in Olbia, including the purpose-built A++ energy-class AZULIS Apartments, AZULIS Clubhouse, AZULIS Villas in Golfo Aranci, and the AZULIS DelleTerme Suites — raising neighbourhood standards and property values.
RENTAL12's investment transformed previously vacant or deteriorating buildings into premium, energy-efficient properties. The AZULIS Apartments were built from the ground up to A++ energy classification. The Tigellio Suites involved a full historical renovation. These projects brought construction jobs, improved streetscapes, and raised the standard of the built environment for the entire neighbourhood — not just guests.
Would converting all short-term rentals to residential housing actually solve Sardinia's housing shortage?
No — an IRPET study in Tuscany estimated that even converting every single STR to residential use would increase total housing supply by at most 10%, with a limited and non-structural effect on long-term rents, while Oxford Economics found the housing price reduction in studied EU cities would be less than 0.7%.
The mathematics are clear: converting all of Olbia's 2,800 STRs to residential use would add roughly 7% to the city's housing supply while 30% of homes remain vacant. The IRPET study in Tuscany — a region with significantly higher STR density than Sardinia — confirmed the effect on rents would be "limited and non-structural." The vacancy problem is 4× larger than the STR sector.
Is the Nomisma study cited in L'Unione Sarda's article an independent piece of research?
No — the Nomisma study referenced in L'Unione Sarda's coverage was commissioned and funded by Airbnb at a cost of €50,000–€60,000, which the newspaper itself acknowledged, raising questions about the selective citation of industry-funded research in a supposedly critical article.
L'Unione Sarda's own article acknowledged that the Nomisma study was Airbnb-funded. Citing industry-funded research in a critical article about that same industry undermines editorial credibility. Independent sources — ISTAT census data, Oxford Economics EU-wide studies, AIGAB data presented at the Chamber of Deputies — consistently show that STRs are a minor factor in housing markets while being a major economic contributor.
How much do short-term rental guests spend at local businesses, and where does the money go?
Oxford Economics data from Australia shows STR guests spend an average of $320 daily on non-accommodation essentials — 34% at restaurants, 20% shopping, 19% groceries, 15% entertainment, and 12% local transport — and 55% of all EU STR stays occur outside major cities, distributing tourism revenue to exactly the kind of smaller communities L'Unione Sarda claims are being harmed.
STR guests have a direct economic multiplier effect in host communities. Unlike hotel guests — whose spending is concentrated within the hotel ecosystem — STR guests cook, shop at local markets, eat at neighbourhood restaurants, and use local services. Nearly 40% of EU STR bookings are made by families with children, who tend to spend more at local businesses and stay longer.
Primary Sources
ISTAT — Censimento Permanente della Popolazione e delle Abitazioni, 2021. Housing stock data for Sardinia (1,034,609 total dwellings, 312,423 vacant). istat.it
Oxford Economics — "Short-Term Rentals Generate €149B Economic Impact, 2.1M Jobs Across EU in 2023." oxfordeconomics.com
AIGAB — Data presented by president Marco Celani at the Italian Chamber of Deputies: 496,000 STR properties, 1.4% of 35M national housing stock, €66B economic impact (2024).
Tourism Review — "Short-term Rentals Represent Important Industry" (Italy). 38% growth 2021–2024, €11B turnover 2023. tourism-review.com
IRPET — Tuscany regional study on STR-to-residential conversion impact (≤10% supply increase, non-structural rent effect).
UniOlbia / SIRED — Sardinia tourism data 2024: 18.9M overnights (+38% YoY), Gallura 7M, Olbia 1.08M, private rentals 3.33M (+41.9%). uniolbia.it
RENTAL12 — Internal operations data: 37 properties, 10+ employees, €10M+ renovation investment, €683,397 billable revenue (2025), 3,150 booked nights. rental12.com/statistics
L'Unione Sarda — Source articles being rebutted: "Cagliari: skyrocketing prices and residents fleeing" and "In Sardinia rental homes are disappearing."
Methodology: All housing stock figures from ISTAT 2021 census (latest available). Olbia housing estimate derived from 63,000 population × 1.65 dwellings/capita (Sardinian ISTAT average). EU economic impact from Oxford Economics independent study (not Airbnb-commissioned). RENTAL12 financial data from verified transactional records as of 2026-01-31.
37 properties. 10+ employees. €10M+ invested. Both holiday and long-term. CIN: IT090047B4000F1530.